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Abstract
We study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm's willingness to pay and
threat payoffs vary over time. Strike payoffs change over time as replacement workers are hired, as
strikers find temporary jobs, and as inventories or strike funds run out. We find that bargaining outcomes
are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary. If dispute costs increase in the long-run, then dispute
durations are longer, settlement rates are lower, and wages decline more slowly during the short-run (and
may even increase). The settlement wage is largely determined from the long-run threat, rather than the
short-run threat.
I. Introduction
With the exception of Hart (1989), studies of bargaining with private information assume that threat
payoffs are constant over time.
1 Yet an important feature of many bargaining settings is the variability of
threat payoffs. For example, in labor contract negotiations, threat payoffs change over time as
replacement workers are hired and trained, as strikers find temporary jobs, as inventories or strike funds
are depleted, and as public assistance to strikers is triggered by passing waiting periods for benefits. In
this paper, we examine the consequences of these threat changes on the bargaining outcome. In particular,
we focus on their impact on strike durations and the pattern of wage concessions during the strike.
We analyze these issues using a model of wage bargaining with a two-phase threat, in which the
short-run threat payoffs differ from the long-run threat payoffs. Our main result is that bargaining
outcomes are substantially altered by time-varying threats. This is especially true for dispute durations,
settlement rates, and the relationship between wages and dispute duration. If dispute costs increase in the
long-run, then dispute durations are longer, settlement rates are lower, and wages decline more slowly
with time (and may even increase). In addition, we show that the settlement wage is largely determined
from the long-run threat, rather than the short-run threat. Hence, focusing solely on observed short-run
threats may be misleading.
Allowing time-varying threats also helps explain empirical results. The theory provides an
explanation for why cooling off periods lengthen disputes (Gunderson and Melino 1990), why settlement
rates are lower during periods of eligibility for unemployment insurance (Kennan 1980b), why strike
durations are longer during business downturns (Kennan 1985, Harrison and Stewart 1989), and why
wages might not decrease with strike durations (Card 1990).
Moreover, the theory can help explain the actions firms and unions take to influence threat payoffs.
A firm may stockpile a 30-day inventory before a strike deadline, it may negotiate a mutual aid pact with
competitors, or it may make plans for hiring replacement workers. A union may arrange for the payment
of strike benefits from the national union or lobby for strike aid from other sources. The consequences
and motivations for these actions can be evaluated with the theory presented here.
Section 2 develops a model of wage bargaining with a two-phase threat. In Section 3, we look at the
implications of a strike threat in which the short-run strike costs differ from the long-run strike costs.Finally, Section 4 describes how policy changes can influence the threat payoffs over time, and how these
changes affect dispute activity. Proofs are in the Appendix.
II. A Model of Wage Bargaining with a Two-Phase Threat
A union and firm are bargaining over the wage to be paid during a contract of duration T. The
union's reservation wage is common knowledge. The value-added of the work force after settlement is v.
It is common knowledge that v is a random variable with distribution F and positive density f on the
interval [l, h]. However, only the firm knows the realization of v.
We consider a threat that consists of two phases indexed by q ˛ {1, 2}: a short-run phase and a long-
run phase with differing payoffs. During the phase q, the union receives a payoff of xq and the firm
receives a payoff of yq(v) = aqv - bq, where aq < 1. The dispute cost 1 - aq represents the fraction of v that
is lost during a dispute. We define cq = (bq - xq)/(1 - aq) to be the relative payment difference during the
threat q: what the firm pays less what the union gets divided by the dispute cost. Then the inefficiency
from dispute is (1 - aq)v + bq - xq = (1 - aq)(v + cq). We assume that the inefficiency is positive for all
v ˛ [l, h], which implies cq > -l.
The threat remains in the first phase until time t ˛ [0, T] and then switches to the second phase after
t. In practice, the transition time t may be endogenous (a firm's decision about when to hire replacement
workers) or exogenous (a waiting period before eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits). In
either case, we assume that t is known before bargaining begins. Given t, the union makes an initial
wage offer. The parties then alternate making wage offers until an agreement is reached. As in Admati
and Perry (1987), the parties' response to an offer can occur at any time after the minimum time between
offers has passed. We consider the limiting case as the minimum time between offers goes to zero.
An outcome of the bargaining, denoted Æt, w, tæ, specifies the time of agreement t ˛ [0, T], the
contract wage w at the time of agreement, and the transition time t ˛ [0, T], as shown in Figure 1 for the
case with t > t. The discounted fraction of the pie remaining at time t is defined as
and d = d(t). Given the outcome Æt, w, tæ, each side's payoffs are the present value of the payoff flows
over [0, T]. Hence, the union's payoff is
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if   A. Full-Information Bargaining with a Two-Phase Threat
A key feature of the signaling equilibrium we analyze is that after a revealing offer is made by the
firm the parties settle at the full-information wage—the wage they would settle at if the revealed
information were common knowledge. A first step, then, in extending the signaling model is to determine
the full-information wage when the bargainers face a two-phase threat with a transition at time t. This
wage is found by backward induction as in Ståhl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982). To eliminate the
importance of who moves first or last, we take the limit as the time between offers goes to zero.
Proposition 1. Suppose the value v is common knowledge and the bargaining has reached time
t < t without a settlement. In the limit as the time between offers goes to zero, the full-information wage
at time t with a firm v is
The full-information wage from a sequence of threats is a weighted average of the full-information wages
for each threat where the weights are given by the fraction of remaining time spent in each threat,
assuming that a settlement is never reached.
An implication of Proposition 1 is that observed bargaining outcomes depend critically on
potentially unobserved threats. For example, in labor contract negotiations the settlement wage in the
early days of a strike will be a weighted average of the full-information wages under the short-run and
long-run threats. If the time until the shift in the strike threat is short relative to the contract length, the
settlement wage is largely determined by the long-run threat. To illustrate, suppose the interest rate is
10%, the contract duration is three years, and the shift occurs after a strike of 30 days. Then at the outset
of bargaining, the long-run threat is given 97% of the weight in determining the settlement wage. Even if
the strike never reaches the long-run phase, the settlement wage is largely based on the long-run threat. It
is the phase not reached that determines the settlement. Empirical models of wage settlements, then, are
misspecified if they only control for determinants of the current threat payoffs.
B. The Signaling Equilibrium with a Two-Phase Threat
In the signaling equilibrium with constant threat payoffs (Cramton and Tracy 1992), the union
makes an initial offer w(m), which is acceptable if the firm's value v exceeds some cutoff level m. The
equilibrium with one-sided uncertainty and a two-phase threat is closely related. As a result of the union's
initial offer w(m), there are three possibilities depending on the firm's value v: if v ‡ m, the firm
immediately accepts the initial offer; if v ˛ [vt, m), the firm makes a counteroffer before the transition is
reached (t £ t); and if v < vt, the firm makes a counteroffer after the transition (t > t).
1. The Firm's Duration Decision
The next proposition considers the firm's optimization problem in response to an initial offer of
w(m) by the union.




-rT). In the subgame that follows, in the limit as the time between offers goes to zero, there is
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following form. If v ‡ m, the firm immediately accepts the offer. If
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        where
            vt £ v < m, where
the second phase is not reached; the firm waits until
of the contract has passed before offering
If v < vt, the second phase is reached; the firm waits until
of the contract has passed before making the offer w2(v). The firm's counteroffer is accepted immediately
by the union.
Proposition 2 tells us how dispute duration and settlement rates are influenced by changes in threat
payoffs over time. Consider the screening model of strikes studied by Hart (1989). Hart analyzes the
case, where the strike cost is initially small but then jumps upward when a “crunch point” is reached (say
the firm runs out of inventory). In this case, a1 > a2, so a > 1, and the dispute duration is higher (the
settlement rate is lower) than when the strike efficiency stays constant at a1 (so a = 1). This is consistent
with Hart's conclusion for the screening model: disputes are lengthened by higher long-run dispute costs.
In contrast, if we assume that strike costs are lower in the second phase (a1 < a2), because the firm is able
to hire replacement workers, then a < 1 and strike duration is reduced.
Interestingly, wages can increase with time during the first phase of a two-phase threat, provided
w1(v) < w2(v). At first glance, this may seem at odds with incentive compatibility. Intuition suggests that a
firm that is supposed to settle at a higher wage after a period of delay would prefer to settle at a lower
wage without any delay. Incentive compatibility requires that the total wage bill, b1D(v) + w(v)(1 - D(v)),
decline with v. However, a firm with a lower v can settle at a higher wage provided the higher wage is
paid for a shorter time (i.e., the dispute is sufficiently long) and the short-run threat is sufficiently
attractive. This may arise if the firm can draw on inventories in the short-run. The firm may prefer to
reduce inventories with a short strike, even if it means settling at a slightly higher wage. Increasing strike
costs during a dispute, then, provides an explanation for the absence of a negative relationship between
wages and strike durations.
In a study of Canadian strikes, Card (1990) found no compelling evidence of a negative relationship
between wages and strike duration. Rather, Card found a small positive relationship for short strikes and
a small negative relationship for long strikes. Our model provides one explanation. If long-run strike
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tcosts are higher than short-run strike costs, then wages can increase in the short-run and then decrease in
the long-run. Whether strike costs tend to increase during a strike is an open question. Some evidence is
found in a survey we conducted of major U.S. strikes in the 1980s. A majority of firms and unions
responded that strike costs would increase if the strike were to continue.
2. The Union's Initial Offer
Given the behavior specified in Proposition 2, we can determine the union's optimal initial offer
w(m).
Proposition 3. The union's initial offer w(m) = (1 - d)w1(m) + dw2(m) is chosen so m maximizes U(m)
defined as follows. If vt £ l, then
If vt > l, then
Proposition 3 simplifies if c1 = c2, as shown below.
Proposition 4. Suppose c1 = c2 = c. The union's initial offer is w(m) = (1 - d)w1(m) + dw2(m), where m
maximizes
The union's expected payoff is
Consider a union deciding between two possible threats q ˛ {1, 2}. The union may decide to use
threat q exclusively. Alternatively, it may decide to mix the threats by using threat 1 from 0 to t and then
adopt threat 2 from t to T. Proposition 4 says that such a mixture does not benefit the union. If c1 = c2,
then the expected payoff to the union from a sequence of threats is simply the weighted-sum of the
expected payoffs from the individual threats, with weights equal to the fraction of time spent in each
threat. Hence, the union will prefer to adopt the threat with the higher expected utility and stick with it.
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If v is uniformly distributed, we can calculate the union's initial offer from Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. Suppose v is uniformly distributed on [l, h]. The union's initial offer w(m) = (1 -
 d)w1(m) + dw2(m) is chosen as follows. Define
If vt £ l, then m = m(c1), where
and the union's expected payoff is
If vt > l, then m is chosen to maximize
The first and second derivatives of U(m) with respect to m are easily computed. Hence, we can use
Newton's method to calculate the optimal m if vt > l. Once the optimal m is determined, straightforward
calculations yield formulas for dispute durations, hazard rates, and wage changes. These are presented in
the Appendix.
Proposition 5 is used to determine the equilibrium outcome under specific threats, so that we can
evaluate the sensitivity of the bargaining outcome to changes in the threat payoffs. For this purpose, we
need to establish benchmark levels for the model parameters. Throughout the remainder of the paper, the
benchmark model will be as in Cramton and Tracy (1993): r = 10%, T = 2.7 years, ai = 75%,
bi = xi = 0.35, and v is uniformly distributed on 1 ± 0.07. The parameters in this benchmark have been set
so the equilibrium outcome is consistent with many of the descriptive statistics in our sample of union
contract negotiations.
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lIII. Implications of a Two-Phase Strike Threat
We now turn to a strike threat with payoffs that change after a particular point from short-run levels
to long-run levels. Two possibilities are considered: high long-run strike costs and low long-run strike
costs.
High Long-run Strike Costs. Hart (1989) studies a strike threat with low costs in the short-run, but
high costs in the long-run after a crunch point is reached. A motivation for costs to take this form is that,
at the time the strike begins, the firm has a stock of inventory to satisfy customer demand. As the strike
continues, inventories are depleted and eventually run out. At the point inventories are exhausted,
customers shift to alternative suppliers and the cost of the strike to the firm becomes much higher. Hart's
main point is that in a screening model of bargaining with private information the presence of a crunch
point at which strike costs escalate can lead to much longer strike durations. Hence, even when the time
between offers is short, the screening model may be consistent with long strikes.
We saw in Proposition 2 that Hart's result extends to the signaling equilibrium. With high long-run
strike costs as a result of a crunch point, strike duration is longer than without the crunch. To gauge the
size of this effect, Table 1 shows how the bargaining outcome changes in the benchmark model as the
short-run and long-run strike costs vary from 5% to 75%, assuming a short-run of either 30 days (t = 30)
or 60 days (t = 60). We assume the firm's wage payment changes in proportion to ai. Thus, as ai varies,
the firm's wage payment bi in phase i of the strike is adjusted so bi/ai = bj/aj where j „ i. The motivation
for this is that the firm must spend proportionally more on labor to raise production during the strike. For
example, by hiring twice as many replacement workers, the firm may double production.
Strike durations, settlement rates, and wage declines are affected by changes in either the short-run
or long-run strike cost. If strikes involve little cost in the short-run, then strike durations are long, and the
settlement rate and wage decline are low in the short-run. With a short-run of 30 days as the short-run
strike cost increases from 5% to 75%, the mean strike duration falls from 42 to 17 days, the short-run
settlement rate rises from 6.6% to 20.9% per week, the long-run settlement rate rises from 15.6% to
96.7% per week, the short-run wage decline rises from 0.5% to 9.1% per 100 days, and the long-run
wage decline falls from 3.1% to 3.0% per 100 days. In contrast, if strikes involve little cost in the long-
run, then strike durations are short, and the settlement rate and wage decline are high in the short-run.
With a short-run of 30 days as the long-run strike cost increases from 5% to 75%, the mean strike
duration rises from 7 to 61 days, the short-run settlement rate falls from 49.7% to 3.7% per week, and the
short-run wage decline falls from 4.6% to -0.1% per 100 days.
Hart's crunch point is illustrated by a high long-run strike cost, as found in the last row of Table 1b.
In this case, the long-run strike cost is 75%, compared with a short-run cost of 25%. This increase in the
strike cost after a short-run of 30 days has the effect of increasing the mean strike duration from 32 to 61
days, reducing the short-run settlement rate from 11.0% to 3.7% per week, reducing the short-run wage
decline from 3.0% to -0.1% per 100 days, and increasing the long-run wage decline from 3.0% to 5.1%
per 100 days. Note that wages actually increase slightly during the first phase.
An alternative to the firm building inventory before a potential strike is for the firm's customers to
build inventory. Customers may be in a better position to store inventory and strikers may be able to
disrupt the delivery of the firm's inventory during a strike. Whether inventory is stored by the firm or its
customers, the outcome on the bargaining is the same: short-run strike costs are reduced.
That strikes are longer when the long-run costs of a strike increase may seem counter-intuitive. Thejoint cost hypothesis (Kennan 1980a, and Reder and Neumann 1980) predicts just the opposite. The
correct intuition stems from understanding that strike duration is determined from the firm's incentive
compatibility condition. In equilibrium, a firm waits until the marginal benefit of waiting (a lower wage)
balances the marginal cost of waiting (additional dispute costs). The increase in long-run strike costs
effectively magnifies the pie that the parties are bargaining over, which is the inefficiency associated with
the dispute. This implies a greater dispersion of wage settlements between the high v firms and the low v
firms. Hence, the incentive for signaling a low v increases with the long-run strike cost, but the strike cost
in the short-run is constant, so duration must increase to balance the costs and benefits of waiting to
signal a low v.
Empirical studies have found that strikes are more frequent (Vroman 1989; Gunderson, Kervin, and
Reid 1986) and shorter (Kennan 1985; Harrison and Stewart 1987) in good times. Our model may
provide an explanation. Suppose, as a result of production smoothing, inventories are greater in bad times
than in good times.
4 Then strike durations should increase in bad times, because of low short-run strike
costs. Strike incidence should fall in bad times, because striking is less likely to be the union's preferred
threat, due to larger inventories and higher unemployment in bad times (Cramton and Tracy 1991).
Low Long-run Strike Costs. Strike costs may decrease over time as the firm hires and trains
replacement workers. Initially, the strikers may be in picket lines and production may stop, but as the
strike continues, the strikers may find temporary jobs and the firm may hire replacement workers to
restore production. Tables 1a and 1b show that a larger strike cost in the short-run leads to a shorter strike
duration, and a higher settlement rate and wage decline in the short-run. For example, if the strike cost
decreases from 25% to 5% after a short-run of 30 days, the mean strike duration falls from 32 days to 7
days, the short-run settlement rate increases from 11.0% to 49.7% per week, and the short-run wage
decline increases from 3.0% to 4.6% per 100 days. With high short-run strike costs, the firm has an
incentive to settle early ￿  the short-run strike costs are high but wages are falling slowly because the
long-run strike costs are low.
IV. The Effect of Policy Changes on Dispute Activity
Government policies can induce shifts in the threat payoffs during a dispute. For example, a striker's
eligibility for UI or other government benefits may depend on the length of the strike. Our two-phase
threat model is useful in evaluating such policies.
The Timing of Unemployment Insurance and Other Benefits. In New York (Rhode Island), strikers
become eligible for unemployment benefits after a strike has lasted eight (seven) weeks. We wish to
evaluate the effect of such a policy on the bargaining outcome. The payment of UI benefits increases the
union's payoff during a strike. It also may increase the firm's wage payment during a strike if UI benefits
are experience rated.
5
Table 2 shows how the bargaining outcome is affected by changes in the union's short-run and long-
run strike payoff, assuming a short-run of either 30 or 60 days. Parameters are set at the benchmark levels
with the exception that v is uniform on 1 ± 0.10, rather than 1 ± 0.07, so not all firm types settle before
the 60 day short-run ends. Increasing the union's long-run strike payoff has the effect of increasing strike
duration, decreasing the long-run settlement rate, decreasing both the short-run and long-run wage
decline, and increasing the union's share of the gains. For example, suppose that eligibility for UI benefits
begins after 60 days, which approximates the policies in New York and Rhode Island, and that UI
benefits increase the union's long-run strike payoff from 0.35 to 0.45 without increasing the firm's wage
bill (i.e., no experience rating, so b1 = b2). Then strike duration increases from 46 to 50 days, the long-runsettlement rate decreases from 21.8% to 12.4% per week, and the short-run wage decline decreases from
3.1% to 1.7% per 100 days. Roughly the same outcomes result when UI benefits are 50% experience
rated (the firm pays one-half of the UI benefit, so b2 = b1 + ½(x2 - x1)). However, if UI benefits are 100%
experience rated, then there is no effect of UI benefits on dispute settlement rates, but a large positive
effect on wages.
The short-run settlement rate is lower than the long-run settlement rate, because of a lack of
heterogeneity over the amount of uncertainty. Without heterogeneity, the settlement rate increases
exponentially over time; with heterogeneity, the settlement rate can decline over time. Hence, when we
introduce heterogeneity over the amount of uncertainty so that the settlement rate is flat in the benchmark
case, then the drop in the long-run settlement rate caused by UI benefits implies that the settlement rate
will be higher before the benefits begin. Kennan (1980b) finds that the settlement rate in New York is
higher during the first eight weeks of a strike.
One may wonder why New York and Rhode Island chose to delay access to UI benefits for strikers.
One explanation is that the delayed access represents a compromise between labor and the legislature.
Labor is most interested in the wage gains that come from access to UI benefits. The legislature is
concerned with the cost of the program. Delaying access serves both goals: wage gains are achieved
without large increases in UI payments, since most strikes end before the UI trigger is reached.
The effect of union strike funds on the bargaining outcome can be evaluated similarly. Paying
strikers from a strike fund has the effect of raising the union's payoff during a strike, assuming the strike
funds are coming from a national fund that is only partially charged back to the local union. If workers
receive payments from a strike fund during the early days of a strike, then strike duration increases, and
the short-run settlement decreases, as shown in Table 2a. For example, suppose the strike fund payment
raises the union's short-run strike payoff from 0.35 to 0.45 for the first 60 days of the strike. Then the
strike duration increases from 46 to 66 days and the short-run settlement rate decreases from 7.7% to
4.5%. The strike fund increases the union's share of the gains, because of the higher wage settlements.
Total bargaining costs increase, because of the longer durations.
Conciliation and Cooling Off Periods. Collective bargaining often takes place in the shadow of
established rules for conciliation and cooling off. In the U.S., contracts negotiated under the Railway
Labor Act involve mandatory mediation and cooling off periods, which result in much longer dispute
durations (Cramton and Tracy 1992). In Canada, a cooling off period follows the conclusion of the
conciliation process. No strike or lockout may take place until both steps are completed. Although
conciliation may have additional effects, both conciliation and cooling off periods force a period of delay
on the parties before a strike can begin. Hence, conciliation and cooling off periods are analogous to an
exogenous strike deadline after the expiration date.
Our basic model applies if we associate the conciliation and cooling off periods with the first phase
of the strike threat. In this case, we have a threat with a small inefficiency in the short-run and a high
inefficiency in the long-run. From the prior section, this implies that dispute durations are increased by
the cooling off period, since the settlement rate in the cooling off period is much less than the settlement
rate once a strike has begun. Strike incidence falls, since some would-be strikes settle during the cooling
off period. Although the cooling off period restricts the union's ability to call a strike, for cooling off
periods that are short relative to the contract length, this constraint has little effect on the union's payoff.
The delayed strike threat remains effective, since both parties anticipate its use after the cooling off
period. Hence, the negotiated wage is based largely on the strike threat, even if a settlement is reachedduring the cooling off period.
Gunderson and Melino (1990) investigate the effects of conciliation and cooling off periods in
Canada. They find that conciliation is associated with lower strike incidence (the effect is significant
when conciliation boards are involved). Both conciliation and cooling off periods are associated with
slightly longer strike durations conditional on a strike taking place. In particular, each additional day of
imposed delay increases the conditional strike duration by one-half day.
6 Hence, dispute durations
increase as a result of conciliation and cooling off periods.
V. Conclusion
Bargaining threats in real situations rarely have the simple stationary structure assumed in the
bargaining models. This paper determines how changes in the threats during negotiations may influence
the bargaining outcome. Changes in the threat payoffs can be due to actions the bargainers take, such as
hiring and training replacement workers during a long strike or calling a strike after a period of delay.
Changes in the threat payoffs also can be exogenously imposed, such as the payment of UI benefits to
strikers if a strike has lasted sufficiently long. In either case, the bargaining outcome is not just a function
of the current threat, but depends critically on how the threat changes over time.
The analysis of time-varying threats provides new insights into how empirical estimation of the
model should proceed. First, the equilibrium wage is predominantly based on the long-run threat payoffs,
rather than the short-run payoffs that are observed in the early days of a dispute. In addition, dispute
durations and the relationship between dispute durations and wages are sensitive to how threat payoffs
change over time. If dispute costs increase over time, then dispute durations are longer and wages decline
more slowly. As a consequence, micro wage equations should include long-run estimates of the economic
and policy variables used in the estimation. Similarly, the settlement rate depends on current and future
values of the variables used in the estimation.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The threat is in phase 1 from t to t and phase 2 from t to T. If negotiations reach
time t, the outcome is simply the full-information wage under the phase 2 threat w2(v), but payoffs are
discounted by g = g(t). Now break the time period from t to t into 2n + 1 half-periods as shown in Figure
2. In each half-period, one party makes an offer and the other accepts or rejects. The discount factor
associated with each half-period of delay is l = g
1/(2n+1). With this finite horizon, we can determine the
optimal offers before time t by backward induction. For an offer to be a best response it must be that the
offer makes the other player indifferent between accepting or countering with her best offer. Since at t
the union gets w2, in the last period before t, the firm makes the offer w
0 = (1 - l)x1 + lw2, which makes
the union indifferent between accepting or rejecting. Suppose with n - 1 periods to go the firm offers w
n-1
to the union. To make the firm indifferent between accepting and rejecting, the union's prior offer w
n-½
must be such that
Hence, to make the union indifferent, the firm's offer w
n with n periods remaining must be
v w a v b v w
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Taking the limit as the number of offers goes to infinity results in
Proof Sketch of Proposition 2. Only a sketch of the proof, focusing on the equilibrium path, is given
here. Off-the-equilibrium-path behavior that supports this equilibrium path can be constructed as in
Cramton (1992).
Suppose the union makes an initial offer w(m) that is accepted by the firm if v ‡ m. We wish to
determine how long a firm with v < m must wait before making a revealing counteroffer. If t ‡ t, the
analysis is the same as the single-threat analysis in Cramton and Tracy (1992). Hence if vt is the type that
makes a revealing offer at time t, then v < vt wait until
of the contract period has passed before making an offer. If t < t, the analysis is complicated by the fact
that the settlement wage is a continuously changing linear combination of the first-phase wage and the
second-phase wage. From Proposition 1,
The time t at which firm v(t) makes a revealing offer is chosen to maximize its utility:
Define D(t) = 1 - d(t) to be the fraction of the contract spent in dispute and let D = 1 - d. We can then
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y v d t v w v t d t 1- + -restate the firm's optimization problem in terms of D:
Taking the derivative with respect to D yields the first-order condition
This is a separable differential equation, which given the initial condition v(0) = m, has the solution
Inverting v(D) yields
Since the firm's preferences satisfy the single crossing property, a necessary and sufficient condition for
D(v) to solve the firm's optimization problem is that v¢(D) < 0. Inspection of the differential equation
reveals that v¢(D) < 0 if and only if (m + c1)/a > 0, which is true so long as a > 0, since c1 > -l. But a > 0
if and only if 1 - a1 > d(a2 - a1), which is always true since d < 1 and a2 < 1. Hence, D(v) solves the firm's
optimization problem. The formula for vt follows since vt = v(d). ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. We wish to determine the union's expected payoff U(m) from making the initial
offer w(m), given the behavior from Proposition 2. Let d1(v) = d(v) = 1 - D(v) be the discount factor for a
firm v that settles before the strike deadline, so
The settlement wage w(v) for a firm v ‡ vt is a linear combination of the first-phase wage and the second-
phase wage weighted by duration:
Let d2(v) be the discount factor for a firm v < vt that settles after the transition to the second phase:
We can now state the union's expected payoff U(m) as a function of m. There are two cases to consider.
In the first, all firm types settle before the transition at t: l ‡ vt. In the second, some firm types settle after
the transition time: l < vt. If l ‡ vt, then for v ˛ [l, m], the union receives x1 for the fraction 1 - d1(v) and
receives w(v) for d1(v); hence,
Otherwise, if l < vt, then for v ˛ [vt, m], the union receives x1 for 1 - d1(v) and receives w(v) for d1(v), and
for v ˛ [l, vt], the union receives x1 for 1 - d, x2 for d - d2(v), and w2(v) for d2(v). Thus,
Substituting the formulas for d1(v), d2(v), and w(v) and simplifying yields
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    whereProof of Proposition 4. When c1 = c2 = c, then I1(v) = I2(v) = I(v), where
Therefore, the expressions for U(m) are the same if vt £ l or if vt > l. Moreover, since w(m) simplifies to
U(m) simplifies to
It follows that U(m) is maximized by maximizing expression (M). The first-order condition for the
optimal m, which must be satisfied since there is an interior optimum, is
Substituting this first-order condition into the expression for U(m) yields the union's expected payoff as a
function of d:
and m maximizes (M). ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof follows directly from substituting F(v) = (v - l)/(h - l) into the
expressions of Proposition 3 and then simplifying. ￿
Formulas for the Example with Uniform Uncertainty
Dispute durations follow from Proposition 2. If v ‡ vt, then the dispute duration is found by solving
for t in the formula
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Define
If vt £ l, then the expected duration is
If vt > l, then the expected duration is
The settlement rate during a dispute is
where v¢ follows from the formulas for D(v):
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+ - +The percentage wage decline during the first phase (v ‡ vt) is
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Footnotes
We have benefited from comments by John Haltiwanger, John Kennan, Kathryn Spier, and seminar participants
at Colorado, Columbia, Iowa, Maryland, Stanford, Wisconsin, and Yale. Funding has been provided by National
Science Foundation grant SBR-9122707.1See Kennan and Wilson (1989, 1993) for surveys.
2We are assuming that the union can commit to any threat path. At a minimum, the threat path should be
sequentially rational: the union should never want to deviate from the path, given the firm's strategy. Fernandez and
Glazer (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) consider a full-information game in which the union selects the threat
each period. They show that every threat path is sequentially rational, which results in multiple perfect equilibria.
Allowing the union to commit to a threat path amounts to letting the union pick an equilibrium from among the set of
perfect equilibria. At least with full information, the union's threat choice is sequentially rational.
3The sample includes 5,002 contracts with large bargaining units in the U.S. from 1970 to 1989. See Cramton
and Tracy (1992), McConnell (1989), and Tracy (1986) for a detailed description of this data.
4This is a heroic assumption in light of the macro empirical evidence that inventories are procyclic (Blinder and
Maccini 1991). Micro-level data, however, indicates that there is tremendous heterogeneity in inventory behavior —
some plants are production smoothers while others are production bunchers (Schuh 1992).  Given this heterogeneity,
it is difficult to draw conclusions from aggregate data.
5These payments may be large. In the 1971 strike at New York Telephone, strikers received $49 million in UI
benefits (roughly 50% of their regular wages) of which $40 million was paid by the firm (New York Telephone Co.
v. New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519).
6This is consistent with our model when we allow heterogeneity in the amount of uncertainty among bargaining
pairs.Figure 1
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Bargaining from t to T with a Threat Transition at t t > t
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1 - a1 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60
5 42 48 6.6 6.8 15.6 27.0 0.5 0.6 3.1 3.1
15 37 39 8.8 9.0 17.7 46.7 1.8 1.8 3.1 3.1
25 32 32 11.0 11.0 20.6 167.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
35 28 27 13.1 12.9 24.5 NA 4.3 4.2 3.0 NA
45 24 24 15.1 14.7 30.2 NA 5.5 5.4 3.0 NA
55 21 21 17.1 16.5 39.2 NA 6.7 6.6 3.0 NA
65 19 19 19.0 18.2 55.9 NA 7.9 7.7 3.0 NA
75 17 18 20.9 19.8 96.7 NA 9.1 8.9 3.0 NA
Table 1b













1 - a2 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60
5 7 7 49.7 52.2 NA NA 4.6 4.5 NA NA
15 20 20 17.9 17.6 60.6 NA 3.8 3.8 2.5 NA
25 32 32 11.0 11.0 20.6 167.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
35 41 43 7.9 8.0 14.3 29.7 2.3 2.3 3.5 3.5
45 48 53 6.2 6.3 11.8 18.8 1.6 1.7 4.0 4.0
55 53 60 5.1 5.2 10.4 14.7 1.0 1.1 4.4 4.4
65 57 66 4.3 4.4 9.6 12.6 0.4 0.5 4.7 4.8
75 61 71 3.7 3.8 9.0 11.3 -0.1 0.0 5.1 5.1
NOTE.— As ai varies, bi = ai bj /aj where j „ i. Other parameters are set at benchmark levels: r = 10%,
T = 2.7 years, aj = 75%, bj = 0.35, x1 = x2 = 0.35, and v is uniform on 1 ± 0.07. Benchmark in italics.
Duration = mean duration (days). SR Settlement Rate = initial settlement rate during phase 1 (% / week). LR
Settlement Rate = initial settlement rate during phase 2 (% / week). SR Wage Decline = median wage
decline during phase 1 (% / 100 days). LR Wage Decline = median wage decline during phase 2 (% / 100
days). NA = not applicable because all firm types settle before phase 2 is reached.20
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x1 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60
0.45 57 66 4.6 4.5 9.5 12.4 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1
0.4 51 55 6.1 6.1 10.3 15.8 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1
0.35 46 46 7.7 7.7 11.3 21.8 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0
0.3 41 38 9.3 9.3 12.6 35.7 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.0
0.25 36 32 10.9 10.9 14.1 101.0 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.0
Table 2b













x2 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60 t=30 t=60
0.45 62 50 7.6 7.7 6.5 12.4 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6
0.4 52 48 7.6 7.7 8.9 17.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
0.35 46 46 7.7 7.7 11.3 21.8 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0
0.3 42 45 7.7 7.7 13.8 26.6 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9
0.25 40 44 7.7 7.7 16.2 31.3 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9
NOTE.— v is uniform on 1 ± 0.10. Other parameters are set at benchmark levels: r = 10%, T = 2.7 years, as
xi varies, xj = 0.35, a1 = a2 = 75%, and b1 = b2 = 0.35. Benchmark in italics.
Duration = mean duration (days). SR Settlement Rate = initial settlement rate during phase 1 (% / week). LR
Settlement Rate = initial settlement rate during phase 2 (% / week). SR Wage Decline = median wage
decline during phase 1 (% / 100 days). LR Wage Decline = median wage decline during phase 2 (% / 100
days).